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THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREGNANT DRUGUSING WOMEN AS CRIMINAL PERPETRATORS
Nancy D. Campbell*
“[W]hat the law tells us to do is not as important as what the law tells us
to be.” 1

Despite clear lack of intent to harm those whom they carry, drug-using
pregnant women have been constructed as de facto criminal perpetrators.
When women become noticeably unable or unwilling to carry out their
assigned social roles and responsibilities as parents, they have often been
demonized as “bad mothers,” and criminalized.2 Women of color who live
with poverty have been disproportionately affected by criminalization,3
which reinforces the view that they are “undeserving” of the right to
procreate. 4 Casting pregnant drug users as intentionally harming the
fetuses they carry, feticide convictions rest upon the attribution of reckless
indifference, “a conscious failure to exercise due care or ordinary care or a
conscious indifference to the rights and safety of others or a reckless
disregard thereof.” 5 Drug use, I argue, falls short of being prima facie
evidence of intent to harm, particularly in social circumstances where drugusing economies are endemic. Drug use is highly likely in the social and
*Assistant Professor, Department of Science and Technology Studies, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute.
1. CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN’S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF
FETAL RIGHTS 100 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Julia E. Hanigsberg & Sara Ruddick, Introduction, in MOTHER TROUBLES:
RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MATERNAL DILEMMAS ix-x (Julia E. Hanigsberg & Sara
Ruddick eds., 1999) (discussing the notion of “bad mothers”); Molly Ladd-Taylor & Laurie
Umanksy, Introduction, in “BAD” MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 2 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Laurie Umansky eds., 1998) (“[T]hroughout
the twentieth century, the label of ‘bad’ mother has been applied to far more women than
those whose actions would warrant the name.”).
3. See Rachel Roth, The Perils of Pregnancy: Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 10
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 150, 152 (2002) (stating that women have been charged with drug
crimes based on a single positive urine test after giving birth to their babies, while “the
Charleston police department has never arrested a male patient and charged him with
possessing drugs on the basis of a positive urine test”).
4. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1444 (1991).
5. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 173 (S.C. 2003).
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economic circumstances of the vast majority of defendants in these cases,
which follow the contours of the localized political geography of illicit
drug use in the United States. 6 It is difficult if not impossible to maintain
that drug-taking is a conscious act intended to harm a fetus. The cases I
examine in this article signal the limits of tolerance and the increasingly
conditional nature of public welfare provision by raising the specter of a
generation of urban mothers—and grandmothers—unable to care for their
kids. These cases also reflect the policy-making role into which hospitals
and the courts have stepped in the face of a legislative void.
Congressional hearings on maternal crack-cocaine use during the late
1980s and early 1990s elucidate the motives behind state and federal
attempts to penalize illicit drug use by pregnant women. 7 Women’s rights
advocates opposed the principle of criminalization behind these hearings,
arguing instead for increased health care access through drug treatment
tailored to the specific circumstances of pregnant women. 8 The hearings
defined the problem as a decline in maternal instinct 9 that had rendered
urban drug-using women “unable to manage their childcare
responsibilities.” 10 Urban women’s maternal incapacity placed a novel
strain upon social services because “mothers and grandmothers could no
longer care for the escalating numbers of drug exposed infants.” 11 If the
burning question of social policy was—“who should absorb the costs of

6. For a compelling argument concerning the concentration of risk and vulnerability in
core urban areas of the United States, see KEVIN FITZPATRICK & MARK LAGORY,
UNHEALTHY PLACES: THE ECOLOGY OF RISK IN THE URBAN LANDSCAPE 168-76 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Falling Through the Crack: The Impact of Drug-Exposed Children on the
Child Welfare System: Hearing on S. 101-846 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family,
Drugs & Alcoholism of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1990)
(discussing the resources devoted to children born to mothers who used drugs during
pregnancy); Impact of Crack Cocaine on the Child Welfare System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 101st Cong. (1990);
Born Hooked: Confronting the Impact of Perinatal Substance Abuse: Hearing Before the H.
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, & Families, 101st Cong. (1989).
8. Advocacy was quite effective in California, where the prosecution of Pamela Rae
Stewart galvanized a coalition that successfully resisted criminalization. See LAURA E.
GÓMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE POLITICS OF
PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 41-62 (1997).
9. See Nancy D. Campbell, Regulating “Maternal Instinct”: Governing Mentalities of
Late Twentieth Century U.S. Illicit Drug Policy, 24 SIGNS 895, 895 (1999) [hereinafter
Campbell, Regulating “Maternal Instinct”] (“Policy makers announced the erosion of
‘maternal instinct’ in the thick of the crack cocaine crisis in the late 1980s.”).
10. Impact of Drugs on Children and Families: Hearing on S. 101-397 Before the S.
Comm. on Labor & Human Res. and the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 25 (1989)
(quoting the testimony of Reed Tuckson, D.C. Commissioner of Public Health).
11. See NANCY D. CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN: GENDER, DRUG POLICY, AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 185 (2000) [hereinafter CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN].
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social reproduction?” 12—the answer was that drug-using mothers clearly
could not. 13 These Congressional hearings highlighted the fear that drugusing women would shift their burdens to the state. 14
Long used as a potent metaphor for social decline, the figure of the
addicted woman encodes compulsion without control, the failures of selfgovernance, and the overwhelming power of illegitimate desires and
insatiable needs. Yet, our view of individual parental responsibility stems
from the notion that only those who can govern themselves are “fit” to
govern others. Despite their marginalization, addicted women have been
held individually accountable by zealous prosecutors for pregnancy
“outcomes” over which they have little control.15 Pregnancy outcomes
have come under scrutiny as states have found compelling interests in fetal
life and death. Fetal rights proponents owe their momentum to the antiabortion movement, which strategically salted “the unborn” in numerous
policy arenas ranging from child health insurance to separate penalties for
the violent assault of a fetus. 16 While prosecutions of pregnant drug-using
women may seem separate from the abortion debate, they have galvanized
both the pro-prosecution anti-abortionists and the anti-prosecution
feminists, civil libertarians, and clinicians who counter them. 17 A flurry of
legislative activity in the 1990s yielded widespread recognition that drug
treatment for pregnant women was largely unavailable.18 Advocates led

12. As a nation we are in a remarkably deep state of denial about who does absorb these
costs and the toll it takes on those that do. Women’s unpaid labor remains the “hidden cost”
of social reproduction, and it is contextualized within the continued undervaluation of
women’s paid and unpaid labor, coupled with the construction of motherhood as itself a
form of social service. Poor women are forced into the low-wage labor market, despite the
oft-noted lack of adequate and affordable child care, health insurance, and other supports
necessary to sustain their labor-force participation. For documentation on the extent to
which women continue to absorb more than their share of these costs, see NANCY FOLBRE,
WHO PAYS FOR THE KIDS? GENDER AND THE STRUCTURES OF CONSTRAINT (1994).
13. For an article that makes this point clearly in reference to the prosecutorial trends
under discussion, see Shalini Bhargava, Challenging Punishment and Privatization: A
Response to the Conviction of Regina McKnight, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513 (2004).
14. See CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note 11, at 185 (“[W]omen are no longer fit or
willing to absorb the tasks and costs of social reproduction.”).
15. On the prosecutorial role, see GÓMEZ, supra note 8, at 63-91.
16. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568
(2004) (providing for the protection of unborn children).
17. Lynn M. Paltrow, The War on Drugs and the War on Abortion: Some Initial
Thoughts on the Connections, Intersections and the Effects, 28 S.U. L. REV. 201 (2001)
[hereinafter Paltrow, The War on Drugs and the War on Abortion].
18. On the variety of legislative activities in one state (California), see GÓMEZ, supra
note 8, at 28-29 (“Between 1986 and 1996, California lawmakers introduced 57 bills
concerning prenatal drug exposure. . . . Before 1986, not a single legislative proposal had
even mentioned drug use during pregnancy.”).
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policy makers to understand the well documented inability of the drug
treatment system to treat pregnant women. By 1992, the crack epidemic
had faded, 19 and legislative and prosecutorial energy declined in most
locales. State supreme courts rejected the use of existing child abuse and
neglect statutes—or creative charges such as the delivery of controlled
substances to babies through the umbilical cord 20—and did not take kindly
to the fact that laws intended to curb drug trafficking were being twisted to
another purpose. When the Supreme Court of Florida overturned Jennifer
Johnson’s drug trafficking conviction in 1992,21 it joined similar decisions,
acquittals, or dismissals in other states.22 Even in South Carolina, where
prosecutorial energy did not decline, the legislature did not explicitly
criminalize illicit drug use during pregnancy, despite open encouragement
from the South Carolina Supreme Court in the Whitner decision. 23 Thus,
courts tended to treat substance abuse during pregnancy as a public health
matter rather than one requiring criminal penalties.
South Carolina, however, has persisted in an ongoing effort to reverse
the direction of this trajectory by placing behavioral conditions upon
pregnant women, requiring cross-reporting between criminal justice and
health care settings, and using health care settings to gain access to
19. CRAIG REINARMAN & HARRY G. LEVINE, CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 42-43 (1997).
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that an adult mother violated the statutory prohibition against the delivery of controlled
substances to minors by taking “cocaine into her pregnant body and caus[ing] the passage of
that cocaine to each of her children through the umbilical cord after birth of the child”).
21. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); see also Gómez, supra note 8, at 79.
The Florida District Court of Appeals has found that Johnson violated a statutory
prohibition against the delivery of controlled substance to minors by passing cocaine to her
fetus through the umbilical cord, Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 420, but the Florida Supreme Court
overturned this decision, finding that:
[w]hile unhealthy behavior cannot be condoned, to bring criminal charges against
a pregnant woman for activities which may be harmful to her fetus is
inappropriate. Such prosecution is counterproductive to the public interest as it
may discourage a woman from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from
providing accurate information to health care providers out of fear of selfincrimination.
Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296.
22. For example, the Pamela Rae Stewart case attracted national attention. See Fetus
Abuse?; Against Doctor’s Orders, TIME MAG., Oct. 13, 1986, at 81; Andrea Sachs, Here
Comes the Pregnancy Police; Mothers of Drug-Exposed Infants Face Legal Punishment,
TIME MAG., May 22, 1989, at 104. Cases elsewhere include State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). For an
exhaustive list of cases, see Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the
Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1004 n.17 (1999).
23. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-84 (S.C. 1997). For a further discussion of
Whitner, see infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
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evidence for criminal prosecutions. 24 Drug-tested as the result of a stealth
protocol set up in 1989 at the Medical University of South Carolina
(MUSC) in Charleston, South Carolina, Crystal Ferguson and her codefendants neither knew about nor consented to the tests. 25 Over its fiveyear life, the MUSC program directly impacted thirty women who were
arrested and charged with possession or distribution of cocaine, or child
neglect. 26 Advocates vigorously attacked the motivations of program staff,
the underlying perceptions of “crack babies” and the “crack-cocaine crisis”
that contributed to their motivations, and the lack of drug treatment
capacity for women in the region. They raised constitutional questions
concerning MUSC’s “human subjects research.” 27 They also circulated
stories that suggested racial targeting had occurred, despite a 1991 study
showing that only 0.79% of South Carolina women tested positive for
cocaine when they gave birth.28 While pregnancy has been used to
abrogate rights and increase social control, 29 the experience of Crystal
24. See Heather Flynn Bell, Comment, In Utero Endangerment and Public Health:
Prosecution vs. Treatment, 36 TULSA L. J. 649, 671-72 (2001).
If we begin interpreting statutes regarding child endangerment to include all
viable fetuses, as was the case in Whitner v. State, it could lead to prosecution of
parents for acts that are legal but might endanger the child’s well-being, including
smoking or the consumption of alcohol. . . . ‘[N]o woman can provide the perfect
womb, [and] prosecution for prenatal drug use could possibly open the door for
any variety of activities during their pregnancy . . . .’
Id. at 671-73.
25. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001); see also Gómez, supra note 8,
at 79-80.
26. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 103.
27. Mary Faith Marshall et al., Perinatal Substance Abuse and Human Subjects
Research: Are Privacy Protections Adequate?, 9 MENTAL RETARDATION &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REVS. 54, 54 (2003).
In 1993, while [MUSC’s] policy was in effect, the former Office of Protection
from Research Risks, the federal office with oversight authority for compliance
with regulations governing federally funded human subjects research determined
that investigators at the Medical University of South Carolina had performed
research on the plaintiffs without their informed consent. The Medical
University’s multiple project assurance was put on hold until corrective actions
were taken.
Id.
28. Kimani Paul-Emile, The Charleston Policy: Substance or Abuse?, 4 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 325, 353 (1999) (citing a study by the South Carolina State Council on maternal,
infant, and child health).
29. See DANIELS, supra note 1, at 6 (“[T]his process of ‘going public’ has both
empowered women and drawn them into more subtle and complex mechanisms of social
control.”); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997) [hereinafter ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY]; LAURA R.
WOLIVER, THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF PREGNANCY 141 (2002) (“[P]unishing drug
addicts who choose to carry their pregnancies to term burdens the constitutional right to
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Ferguson and her co-defendants resulted from a set of social exclusions and
dehumanizing assumptions that transcend the circumstances of this case.
Yet the United States Supreme Court responded with a ruling in Ferguson
v. Charleston that was but a narrow victory for reproductive rights
advocates. 30 As Birgitte Nahas noted, the Court never reached the
questions of the constitutionality of South Carolina’s characterization of the
viable fetus as a person, 31 or of mandatory child abuse reporting laws. 32
The Court ruled that testing pregnant women for drugs without their
knowledge or consent constituted unlawful searches and seizures in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 33 This ruling left South Carolina free
to explore just how far it could go toward criminalizing women’s behavior
during pregnancy by scrutinizing pregnancy outcome.
Pregnancy outcome, of course, is determined by many conditions that
transcend individual circumstances and affect wider populations, including
poverty and lack of access to nutrition and health care. Yet, it is difficult to
argue that policies granting fetal rights and rendering women’s rights
conditional will negatively affect women as a class, because these policies
target individual drug-using women. Although there is very little social
gain in prosecuting female drug users, that may be beside the point.
Feminist political scientists Cynthia Daniels and Rachel Roth suggest that
such policies are a form of “symbolic vengeance” that send a symbolic
message that some pregnant women threaten the social order. 34 The
putative balance between fetal rights and women’s rights constructed by
fetal rights advocates obscures the real conflict between women and the
state. 35 It makes it seem as if fetal rights are not contingent, conditional, or

autonomy over reproductive decisions, helping to perpetuate a racist hierarchy in our
society.”).
30. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
31. See Brigitte M. Nahas, Comment, Drug Tests, Arrests, and Fetuses: A Comment on
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Narrow Opinion in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 8 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 105, 141 (2001) (explaining how the majority “ducked” these issues). The
South Carolina State Supreme Court held that a viable fetus is a person in State v. Horne,
319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984), and upheld a criminal neglect conviction in Whitner v.
State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997).
32. See Nahas, supra note 31, at 141.
33. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001); see also Marshall et al., supra note
27, at 54.
34. See DANIELS, supra note 1, at 117 (“The prosecution and incarceration of drugaddicted pregnant women operates symbolically as retribution for the women’s
transgressions.”); RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL
RIGHTS 15 (2000) (“Criminal trials in the United States often serve as a kind of public
theater or modern-day morality play, and so it is right to point out this symbolic function.”).
35. On “fetal rights” generally, see DANIELS, supra note 1; Martha A. Field, Controlling
the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 114 (Summer 1989); Janet
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contested, but rather are well established. For this reason, Roth argues for
recasting the conflict as one between pregnant women and the state: a
“maternal-state conflict.” 36
In Whitner v. State 37 and State v. McKnight, 38 South Carolina courts
upheld individual women’s convictions. These cases illustrate how
maternal-state conflicts play out in a “fetal rights” state. Cornelia Whitner
was convicted of criminal child neglect for ingesting cocaine during her
third trimester; her healthy, now-teenage son tested positive for cocaine
metabolites at birth. 39 Regina McKnight, who sporadically used cocaine
during her pregnancy and sought treatment for her drug use, delivered a
stillborn child eight-and-a-half months into her pregnancy. 40 She “became
the first woman in America to be convicted of homicide by child abuse
based on her behavior during pregnancy,” and was sentenced to twenty
years in prison. 41
Fetal rights law is reaching a state of maturity in a friendly political
climate. We see evidence of its “success” in the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act of 2004 42 and the recent extension of child health insurance
to unborn children. 43 Fetal rights proponents have pushed to the extreme,
Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 9 (1987); Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With
Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599
(1986).
36. See ROTH, supra note 34, at 90 (“The expression ‘maternal-fetal conflict’ commonly
used to describe these situations is a misnomer, but these cases certainly are about
conflict—between women and medical authority and between women and state authority.”).
37. 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997) (holding that a state may impose additional
penalties for pregnant women who engage in illegal conduct).
38. 576 S.E.2d 168, 179 (S.C. 2003) (affirming lower court conviction of a woman who
gave birth to a stillborn baby because of drug abuse).
39. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778-79. Whitner served an eight-year sentence.
40. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 170-71; see also Lynn Paltrow, What Happened to Regina
McKnight?, HARM REDUCTION COMM. (Harm Reduction Coalition, New York, N.Y.),
Spring 2004 [hereinafter Paltrow, What Happened to Regina McKnight?], available at
http://www.harmreduction.org/pubs/news/spring04/paltrow.html.
41. Paltrow, What Happened to Regina McKnight?, supra note 40, at 2 (noting also that
the final eight years of McKnight’s sentence were suspended); see also McKnight v. South
Carolina, 540 U.S. 819 (2003) (denying McKnight’s appeal).
42. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568
(2004).
43. Congress created the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in 1997 to
address the growing number of children without healthcare. See Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, Welcome to the State Children’s Health Insurance Program,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/about-SCHIP.asp (last viewed Dec. 2, 2005). SCHIP
provides coverage to “targeted low-income children.” Id. An unborn child now can qualify
as a targeted low-income child by the State (and therefore be eligible for SCHIP) if other
applicable State eligibility requirements are met. See 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2005). An
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as shown by their use of fetal rights phrases such as “the ‘right’ of a mother
to kill her children” 44 or “addicted to abortion.” 45 Although most states
count a pregnant mother as a single citizen, fetal rights proponents have
sought to create “two litigants” (the pregnant mother and her unborn
child). 46 As one proponent argued in reference to McKnight,
if a woman possesses a constitutional right to kill her baby at any time
during a pregnancy (and the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
she does), then why should it matter that Ms. McKnight exercised her
right by smoking crack as opposed to paying an abortionist to dismember
and vacuum out her baby? Indeed, Ms. McKnight did not set out to kill
her unborn child—it was simply an unintended result of her smoking
crack. Why should she be sent to prison for doing negligently something
which, if done intentionally, qualifies as a constitutional right? 47

Intention mattered to this author: “in an abortion, unlike in a crack-smoking
death, the mother does set ‘out to ‘intentionally harm her child.’”48
Feticide laws sit uneasily with decriminalized abortion now that
pregnant women themselves are charged and convicted under them. State
legislatures originally passed feticide laws to address third party harms to
fetuses separate from third party harms to pregnant women. 49 Whitner v.
State, however, widened the scope of South Carolina’s child neglect statute
to include viable fetuses and served as precedent for State v. McKnight.50
The Whitner Court held that viable fetuses have been considered “persons
holding certain legal rights and privileges” within the state of South
Carolina since the early 1960s. 51 The court continued, “[o]nce the concept

alternative would have been to extend universal coverage to pregnant women.
44. Mark
Trapp,
Addicted
to
Abortion
(June
18,
2001),
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0601abortion.htm (“[T]he South Carolina
Advocates for Pregnant Women is nothing more than another pro-abortion group, willing to
excuse any behavior, no matter how reprehensible, in order to preserve the ‘right’ of a
mother to kill her children.”).
45. See, e.g., Will Johnston, A Proposal for a New Strategy Towards Abortion, VITAL
SIGNS (Canadian Physicians for Life, Ontario, Can.), Fall 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.physiciansforlife.ca/Fall%20’02.html (“[I]t is time to see that our society as a
whole has become addicted to abortion.”).
46. Patrik Jonsson, South Carolina Tests the Bounds of a Fetus’s Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 28, 2001, at 1 (describing the history of fetal laws in America, and South
Carolina’s fetal laws in particular).
47. Trapp, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. Lynn Okamoto, House Passes Feticide Bill, DES MOINES REGISTER, Apr. 7, 2004, at
1 (describing Iowa’s proposed legislation to provide for two victims, and noting that thirtyone states have their own fetal homicide laws).
50. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997).
51. Id. at 779.
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of the unborn, viable child as a person is accepted, we have no difficulty in
holding that a cause of action for tortious injury to such a child arises
immediately upon the infliction of the injury.” 52 The Whitner court cited
earlier cases in which third parties committed feticide, such as State v.
Horne, where a husband stabbed his wife to death and a full-term fetus died
in her womb from suffocation. 53 The ostensible reason for creating “two
litigants” was to address the lack of redress in wrongful death fetal
homicide cases.
The Whitner Court granted fetuses the status of persons, tendentiously
explaining, “[w]e do not believe that the plain and ordinary meaning of the
word ‘person’ has changed in any way that would now deny viable fetuses
status as persons.” 54 Dissenting Justice Moore chastised his colleagues for
their “course of judicial activism rejected by every other court to address
the issue.” 55 Justice Moore argued against the majority’s strained assertion
that a viable fetus is a child. 56 He noted that greater inequities result from
the majority’s argument for “equal treatment of viable fetuses and
children.” 57 In particular, pregnant women would be immune from
prosecution if they quit using cocaine pre-viability, and pregnant women
who have illegal abortions only get two-year sentences for killing a viable
fetus. 58 He noted that if Whitner, whose son was healthy, had instead
legally aborted, she would have been better off in terms of sentencing. 59
The amicus brief in McKnight was filed by organizations committed to a
harm-reduction drug policy. 60 Careful not to endorse non-medical use of
drugs during pregnancy by either parent, these organizations sought to use
scientific consensus on the effects of prenatal ingestion of cocaine to
McKnight’s advantage. 61 Arguing that the prosecution was “devoid of

52. Id. at 780 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44
(S.C. 1964)).
53. See State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984).
54. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780.
55. Id. at 787 (Moore, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 787-88 (Moore, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 788 (Moore, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See generally Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, Regina McKnight
Submitted By South Carolina Medical Ass’n et al., McKnight v. S.C., 540 U.S. 819 (2003)
(No. 02-1741), 2003 WL 22428153 [hereinafter Brief in Support of McKnight]. The amicus
brief was submitted by the South Carolina Medical Association; South Carolina Association
of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Counselors; American Nurses Association; National
Association of Social Workers; Association of Maternal and Child Health Programs; and
Institute For Health and Recovery.
61. Id. at 2-3.
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scientific underpinning,” they mobilized science to show that the evidence
could not plausibly suggest, much less prove, causation of stillbirth. 62
While medical evidence does not “indicate that cocaine is entirely benign
for mother and fetus,” the risks “fall far short of the misconception of
extreme harm typified by the ‘crack baby’ myth.” 63 The brief writers then
cited evidence on the prevalence of stillbirth, its various causes, and the
lack of certainty concerning causation (a full ten percent of stillbirths go
Indeed, they noted that poverty, homelessness,
unexplained). 64
malnutrition, and the stress associated with them could exacerbate known
causes of stillbirths. 65 They referred to the prosecution’s insistence that
cocaine ingestion caused McKnight’s stillbirth as an “inferential leap.”66
The State’s testifying pathologists inferred causality from the simple
coexistence of cocaine metabolites and stillbirth. 67 The amici argued that
“[s]uch an inference does not withstand scientific scrutiny.” 68 They
contended that the pathologists failed to consider far more common reasons
for fetal demise, many of which may have impacted McKnight. 69 The
amici documented confusion among treatment providers and their clients as
to how mandatory reporting laws were supposed to work, indicating that
there are ongoing debates over whether mandatory reporting laws deter
women from seeking prenatal and obstetrical care.70 Finally, the amici
contended that the court would “vitiate the longstanding recognition by the
courts and the medical community that addiction is a disease, not a crime”
if it upheld McKnight’s conviction. 71
The unstable legal status of addiction—that is, our decision to respond to
it as both crime and disease, but more a crime for some and a disease for
others—contributes to the uncertainty of what rights and whose rights
should be upheld in cases where fetal rights clash with maternal rights.
Although the McKnight amici identified the “longstanding recognition . . .
that addiction is a disease, and not a crime” it did not acknowledge that

62. Id. at 2.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2-3; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 n.8 (1962) (noting that
in 1925, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “persons addicted to narcotics ‘are
diseased and proper subjects for (medical) treatment’”) (quoting Lindner v. United States,
268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)).
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some “diseases” retain the moral character of a voluntaristic act.72
Historians have identified the pervasive construction of alcoholism and
drug addiction as inexorably powerful “diseases of the will.”73 The
characterization of drug use as intentional or voluntary is commonly
expressed by those who believe that criminalization is a useful response to
drug use by pregnant and parenting women.
Feminist legal scholars see the matter differently, for they have
embraced policies that “recognize[] that women who bear children share
the government’s objective of promoting healthy births.” 74 Women’s
rights advocate Dawn Johnsen refers to this as the “facilitative model,”
because it facilitates women’s choices.75 Johnsen describes an alternate
approach, called the “adversarial model,” which is characterized by
attempts to “impose special restrictions and duties on women solely
because they are or may become pregnant.”76 Johnsen disapproves of the
adversarial model, arguing that, “[s]ubjecting women to special restrictions
because of their childbearing capability interferes with rights the
Constitution recognizes as so fundamental to individual liberty that they
may be restricted by the government only under the most compelling
circumstances. Adversarial policies must therefore satisfy the demanding
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.”77 Without the protection of the
strict scrutiny standard, Johnsen argued there would be “no logical stopping
point to the kinds of personal decisions by women that could be secondguessed by zealous prosecutors, estranged husbands and former lovers, or
judges scrutinizing an isolated decision with the benefit of hindsight.”78
There are several dangers of using pregnancy outcomes in the
adversarial context. Such outcomes create an inherent conflict between
promoting healthy births and protecting women’s fundamental liberties. 79
Additionally, they over-scrutinize women’s behavior while obscuring the

72. Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 60, at 2-3.
73. See generally MARIANA VALVERDE, DISEASES OF THE WILL: ALCOHOL AND THE
DILEMMAS OF FREEDOM (1998).
74. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without
Sacrificing Women’s Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 571 (1992).
75. Id.
76. Id. The adversarial model views “the woman and the fetus she carries as distinct
legal entities having adverse interests, and assume[s] that the government’s role is to protect
the fetus from the woman.” Id.
77. Id. at 581. Johnsen finds that “[u]sing adversarial approached to the problem of
drug use during pregnancy when alternative facilitative approaches exist” is both “bad
policy” and “a basis for finding such policies unconstitutional.” Id. at 606.
78. Id. at 586.
79. Id. at 613.
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behavior of men. 80
Finally, the use of pregnancy outcomes is
counterproductive; it deters the very behaviors that contribute to healthy
births. 81
CONTEXTUALIZING THE CLASH BETWEEN CONDITIONAL RIGHTS AND
UNCONDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Fueled by the crack-cocaine crisis of the late 1980s, the War on Drugs
became a “war on women.” 82 It sharply increased the number of women
under the control of the criminal justice system, especially due to random
drug testing of parolees. 83 Feminist sociologists and historians who study
women as criminal perpetrators argue that women’s offenses must be
contextualized 84 within the circumstances of trauma that derive from living
in contexts of “structural violence.” 85 They return us to a few simple
questions: Whose rights are at stake? What privacy and other protections
are accorded to the vulnerable? How will benefits, burdens, or the basic
autonomy required to discharge one’s obligations and responsibilities be
distributed? What are the terms and conditions of the social contract(s) by
which we abide, and do these terms and conditions differ for the poor, for
those who are entangled in structural constraints? What happens to those
whose circumstances prevent them from exercising their rights or
discharging their duties? As I have argued elsewhere, “[w]omen’s rights as
persons are made conditional—rights are purchased by [some] women’s
good behavior as mothers and forfeited in the case of bad behavior [by
other women].” 86
This conditionality is based on a false antithesis between the rights of
women as persons and the obligations of women as mothers which was
created by the fetal rights campaign. I refer to this as the “irreconcilable
differences model,” contending that such a framework presents practical,
legal, and political problems of an irresolvable nature. Although fetal
rights proponents restage this false antithesis, it is not limited to the fetal
rights debate. Since suffrage, according to historian Linda Gordon, “[t]he
80. See id. at 607-08 (noting cases in which “men and women are similarly situated, yet
government action singles out only women for penalties and restrictions”).
81. Id. at 589.
82. MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN, AND CRIME 99
(1997).
83. Id. at 147.
84. Id. at 142-43.
85. See generally PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR (2003). Farmer uses the term “structural violence” as “a
broad rubric that includes a host of offensives against human dignity.” Id. at 8.
86. CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note 11, at 188.
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problem [has been] that the mother-child separation occurred not in a
feminist discourse that would have validated women’s needs and the work
of parenting, but in a discourse that treated children, quite unrealistically,
alone, as a group with a unique claim on the state.” 87 That specious split
has now been extended through the attempted institutionalization of an
even less realistic discourse that treats fetuses as a group with a uniquely
compelling claim upon the state apart from the women whose bodies
sustain them.
Fetal rights proponents defend fetuses in ways that render women’s
rights conditional. 88 Their approach ensures that women continue to
shoulder the burdens of biosocial reproduction:
the burden on the woman is to stop using illegal drugs once she has
exercised her constitutional decision not to have an abortion. . . . Once
the mother has made the choice to have a child, she must accept the
consequence of that choice. One of the consequences of having children is
that it creates certain duties and obligations to that child. If a woman does
not fulfill those obligations, then the state must step in to prevent harm to
the child. 89

Attempts to gain criminal liability for fetal endangerment are in part
about social reproduction. This point was illustrated in a 1990 Criminal
Justice Ethics symposium in which Phillip Johnson lamented the “ACLU
philosophy” in the face of the “crack mother prosecutions” that reveal a
nation “desperately” trying to slow the “alarming disappearance of personal
and family norms.” 90 According to Johnson, “[t]he great-grandparents of
today’s crack mothers and absent fathers had a religious morality that
enabled them in most cases to provide an admirable family life during the
Great Depression, when poverty and discrimination were everywhere and
no one imagined that child care was the federal government’s business.”91
Johnson’s historical analysis suggests that fetal rights proponents have a
moral agenda to counter the “license for self-indulgence” that has taken
hold as individuals “have come to think of themselves as rights-bearing and
pleasure-seeking individuals.” 92 That a “license for self-indulgence”

87. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE 1890-1935, at 100 (1994).
88. Sam S. Balisy, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection
for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1220-21 (1987).
89. Nova D. Janssen, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Using Drugs
During Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 762 (2000).
90. Phillip E. Johnson, The ACLU Philosophy and the Right to Abuse the Unborn, 9
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 48, 51 (1990).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 49.
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should be withheld from the poor will not come as a surprise to those
familiar with both the multiple indignities to which the poor are subjected
and the recent trend toward conditioning public aid on good behavior.93
Drug-using women are vulnerable due to social-structural circumstances
beyond their control. Additionally, a symbolic vengeance has been exacted
through the enforcement of laws and policies targeted at poor, pregnant,
drug-using women, most of whom are African-American. Although
punitive efforts have been highly localized—most of the cases have come
from South Carolina 94—the issues at their core transcend the local
circumstances of specific cases. They are not merely about biological
reproduction, but about women’s over-responsibility for the difficult labors
of social reproduction and lack of public support for the exercise of
reproductive rights and decisions. How many women in McKnight’s or
Whitner’s situation—burdened by a lifetime of abuse and bound by the
structures of constraint specific to their race, class, and gender 95—can be
said to make clear, constitutional decisions to have children? Not only
have courts and legislatures everywhere declined to support poor women’s
autonomy in reproductive decision-making, 96 they also have burdened the
path of even highly enfranchised women exercising reproductive choice.97
The drug and pregnancy debate only makes sense when located in the
geography of social inequality.
The displacement of rights from women to the fetus was the antiabortion movement’s response to the framing of abortion as women’s right
to choose. 98 First-generation feminist characterizations of women’s
reproductive autonomy set up women’s rights to conflict with those of the
fetuses they were carrying. The earliest “fetal rights” cases, assembled by
Janet Gallagher after a pattern emerged in 1982, involved compelled
Cesarean sections. 99 In particular, advocates for pregnant women were

93. See SANFORD F. SCHRAM, AFTER WELFARE: THE CULTURE OF POSTINDUSTRIAL
SOCIAL POLICY 168-69 (2000).
94. See Dana Page, Note, The Homicide by Child Abuse Conviction of Regina
McKnight, 46 HOW. L.J. 363, 370 (2003).
95. See id. at 365-69 (describing the abusive conditions of McKnight’s life).
96. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY, supra note 29, at 25.
97. See SUSAN M. BEHUNIAK, A CARING JURISPRUDENCE: LISTENING TO PATIENTS AT THE
SUPREME COURT 62-63 (1999) (examining a series of abortion cases and concluding that the
courts disregarded the patients’ knowledge and instead focused almost exclusively on
medical knowledge).
98. See CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING
SOCIAL CHANGE (1990).
99. See, e.g., Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What’s Wrong with
Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 11 (1987) (“The most dramatic and highly
publicized claims of ‘fetal rights’ have been made in the context of coerced Caesarean
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galvanized by the plight of Angela Carder.100 Georgetown Hospital, acting
under court authorization, forced Mrs. Carder, a young, terminally ill
woman, to undergo a C-section against her wishes, as well as those of her
husband, her parents, and her physicians.101 Both Mrs. Carder and the
fetus died as a result of that C-section. 102 This case made apparent the
limitations of the rhetoric of “choice,” clearing the way for advocacy on
behalf of pregnant women to become somewhat separate from mainstream
advocacy for reproductive rights. This differentiation occurred even as
fetal rights proponents sought to construct laws favorable to their antiabortion position. 103 Thus the limitations of the rhetoric of choice were not
simply symbolic—they opened the door to criminalization not only of
abortion but of stillbirth or the presence of drug metabolites by making it
appear that all behaviors during pregnancy are intentional and that fairly
arcane and unproven matters of clinical practice are “common
knowledge.” 104
Trying to shift away from the individualist rhetoric of the pro-choice
movement, a small network of feminist reproductive rights advocates that
initially worked out of the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project argued
that pregnant women and fetuses share an interest in healthy births.105
They ran up against the mainstream of women’s policy research and
reproductive rights advocacy organizations, which had become
sophisticated users and defenders of the “dominant language of liberal
individualism” 106 to prevent their marginalization and dissolution during
the 1980s; “[m]ost of the organizations that did survive the 1980s
maintained their credibility while keeping feminist claims—for women’s
economic rights, overcoming violence and sexual assault against women,
sections.”).
100. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 1, at 42; Terry E. Thornton & Lynn Paltrow, The
Rights of Pregnant Patients: Carder Case Brings Bold Policy Initiatives, 8 HEALTHSPAN 10
(1991), available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/angela.htm.
101. DANIELS, supra note 1, at 31-32.
102. Id. at 32. The Carder family sued the hospital for violating Angela Carder’s civil
rights. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld Mrs. Carder’s rights and argued that the lower
court “erred in subordinating [Angela Carder’s] right to bodily integrity in favor of the
state’s interest in potential life.” In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
103. See CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note 14, at 182 (describing how “choice” is a
“flexible term that triggers an emphasis on moral accountability”).
104. For a discussion of the epistemological underpinnings of “common knowledge,” see
generally MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW’S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE (2003).
105. See generally Johnsen, supra note 74.
106. Roberta Spalter-Roth & Ronnee Schreiber, Outsider Issues and Insider Tactics:
Strategic Tensions in the Women’s Policy Network During the 1980s, in FEMINIST
ORGANIZATIONS: HARVEST OF THE NEW WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 105, 115-17 (Myra Marx
Ferree & Partricia Yancey Martin eds., 1995).
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abortion rights, civil rights, and political empowerment—on the policy
Such liberal
agenda, albeit not always in their purest form.” 107
individualist rights talk bolstered the credibility of women who could
conform to prevailing notions of gender-neutral equality, self-discipline,
and good conduct at the expense of those who could not. Choice was a
discursive political trap that led the liberal reproductive rights movement to
be painted as “anti-fetal rights.” 108
Rights talk makes it seem as if women deliberately take illegal drugs in
order to harm fetuses, which plays into the hands of fetal rights proponents.
Claims of intentionality should rest on proof that a woman knows the
extent to which cocaine harms her fetus. In McKnight, however, the court
only found proof of extreme indifference because McKnight, like Whitner,
supposedly possessed common knowledge about the effects of cocaine:
although the precise effects of maternal crack use during pregnancy are
somewhat unclear, it is well documented and within the realm of public
knowledge that such use can cause serious harm to the viable unborn
child. Given this common knowledge, Whitner was on notice that her
conduct in utilizing cocaine during pregnancy constituted child
endangerment. 109

The court concluded that “the fact that McKnight took cocaine knowing
she was pregnant was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury on whether
she acted with extreme indifference to her child’s life.”110 Given the
gravity of the charge, the court should have based its conclusion that
McKnight acted with extreme indifference on something other than the
following assertion that Judge Toal made twelve years prior in another
case: “The drug ‘cocaine’ has torn at the very fabric of our nation. Families
have been ripped apart, minds have been ruined, and lives have been lost.
It is common knowledge that the drug is highly addictive and potentially
fatal.” 111 This quotation, along with some circumstantial evidence from a
Department of Social Services (DSS) investigator who testified that
McKnight knew she was pregnant and used cocaine, served as the only
evidence of McKnight’s criminal intent. 112
The science of in utero cocaine exposure has not been unequivocal.

107. Id. at 125.
108. See RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE
SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 220-24 (2001)
(providing a thorough critique of the idiom of “choice”).
109. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 173 (S.C. 2003).
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting State v. Major, 391 S.E.2d 235, 237 (S.C. 1990)).
112. Id.
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Researchers and medical organizations including the American Medical
Association have expressed concerns that their “rush to judgment” in the
early days of the crack-cocaine scare was harmful to children.113
Investigators have since documented few differences between children
from similar social and economic circumstances who are exposed to
cocaine in utero versus those who are not. 114 The amicus briefs in
McKnight offered far more scientific evidence that cocaine use did not
negatively affect pregnancy than the prosecution offered to support its
contrary assertions. 115 Current studies show that in utero cocaine exposure
is about as harmful as tobacco exposure—and less harmful than heavy
alcohol exposure. 116 But these studies did not accord with the governing
mentalities of the court, which disregarded them. In fact, Whitner and
McKnight did not suffer the two most problematic complications of in vitro
cocaine exposure—ruptured membranes and placental abruption. What
then was going on in South Carolina?
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISTS
Prosecutors dictate whether and how a drugs-and-pregnancy case will be
brought. Legal sociologist Laura Gómez has found that local prosecutors,
who typically used “crack baby” terminology, embraced two extreme,
polarized strategies: one very punitive, revealing an obvious intent to
punish, and the other a strategy of inaction.117 Johnson v. State
demonstrates an extremely punitive strategy that ultimately failed when
Johnson’s conviction was overturned by the Florida Supreme Court. 118 A
paucity of cases fell into the middle range of Gómez’s continuum—
“moderately punitive” diversion that coerced women into treatment and

113. L.C. Maynes et al., The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to
Judgment, 267 JAMA 406, 406 (1992).
114. Deborah A., Frank et al., Growth, Development, and Behavior in Early Childhood
Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Systematic Review, 285 JAMA 1613, 1621-24
(2001) (“[A]mong children up to 6 years of age, there is no convincing evidence that
prenatal cocaine exposure is associated with any developmental toxicity different in severity
of age, scope, or kind from the sequelae of many other risk factors [including tobacco,
marijuana, alcohol, or the quality of the child’s environment].”).
115. See Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 60, at 3-24; see also supra notes 6071 and accompanying text (describing the scientific evidence in the McKnight brief).
116. See Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 60, at 15-16.
117. GÓMEZ, supra note 8, at 74, 78.
118. 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the prosecution of pregnant women
who engage in activities that are harmful to the fetus is inappropriate and against public
interest); see also GÓMEZ, supra note 8, at 79. For more information on the Johnson case,
see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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softer, less punitive diversion. 119 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston120
there was a potent synergy between the elements of extremely punitive
prosecutorial behavior, legal coercions, and moral fervor. 121 Charles
Condon, the publicly outspoken anti-abortion prosecutor in that case,
helped set up the “rights talk” version of the debate: “[y]ou have the right
to an abortion. You have the right to have a baby. You don’t have the
right to have a baby deformed by cocaine.”122 As the State Supreme Court
wrote in Whitner and quoted in McKnight:
It strains belief for Whitner to argue that using crack cocaine during
pregnancy is encompassed within the constitutionally recognized right of
privacy. Use of crack cocaine is illegal, period. No one here argues that
laws criminalizing the use of crack cocaine are themselves
unconstitutional. If the State wishes to impose additional criminal
penalties on pregnant women who engage in this already illegal conduct
because of the effect the conduct has on the viable fetus, it may do so.
We do not see how the fact of pregnancy elevates the use of crack cocaine
to the lofty status of a fundamental right. 123

The argument that reproductive rights advocates promote the use of
crack cocaine by pregnant women or construct it as a fundamental right is
belied by McKnight’s amicus briefs. 124 But the tendentious claim serves
the symbolic value of tarring reproductive rights advocates with the brush
of condoning drug use and rendering their cause absurd or malicious. This
disdainful tone pervaded the McKnight Court’s dismissal of the defense’s
fears that reproductive rights were being rolled back, or that women would
be deterred from seeking medical help. The court remarked in a footnote
that, “[a]s did Whitner, McKnight forebodes a parade of horribles and
points to commentators who object to the prosecution of pregnant women
as being contrary to public policy and deterring women from seeking
appropriate medical care and/or creating incentives for women to seek
abortions to avoid prosecution.” 125 The court dismissed the legitimate
concerns that therapeutic relationships would be jeopardized and
fundamental trust between women and medical professionals would be

119. See GÓMEZ, supra note 8, at 78-79; see also CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note
11, at 189.
120. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
121. See generally id.
122. GÓMEZ, supra note 8, at 79. Condon later became the South Carolina Attorney
General. Id.
123. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 176-77 (S.C. 2003) (quoting Whitner v. State,
492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997)).
124. See generally Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 60.
125. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 175 n.5.
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eroded. 126 The strategy of fetal rights law and policy entrepreneurs has
been to paint feminist advocates as paranoid projectors of a “parade of
horribles” out of misguided concerns for public health and social justice.
When advocates struggled against punitive policies directed toward
pregnant women who use drugs, their issue fell between the cracks of the
feminist reproductive rights movement, the civil rights movement, the
women’s health movement, and the drug policy reform movement.127
Lynn Paltrow argues that “[t]hose who are concerned about fundamental
issues of social justice may be losing ground, missing opportunities to build
coalitions and strengthen arguments by failing to recognize the similarities
among and relationships between the [drug policy and reproductive rights]
issues.” 128 Fetal rights claims tend to undermine coalitions for health care,
disability rights, environment, drug policy, prison reform efforts, even
immigrant health care rights. Yet, fetal rights proponents use drug policy
to justify limiting (some) women’s rights in ways that will ultimately
retract (all) women’s rights. Neoconservatives use a wide and almost
bewildering range of policy arenas ranging from welfare reform to crime
control to gain an advantage in reproductive rights debates. Nowhere have
they been quite so successful as within the illicit drug policy arena—and
nowhere quite so successful as in South Carolina.129 Drug policy has been
especially useful to this neoconservative project because the scourge of
drugs separates some (especially bad) women out from (mostly good)
women without much dissent from either. To the extent that feminists buy
into the idea of splitting off “good” women from “bad,” our coalitions will
be undermined.
The policy design literature implicates the production of “target
populations” within what Anne Larason Schneider and Helen Ingram call
“degenerative politics.” 130 The term “degenerative politics” refers to issue
contexts where divisions between “target populations” that are deserving
and undeserving, worthy and unworthy, are deeply inscribed.131 Schneider
and Ingram identify four different policy targets: (i) the already
advantaged; (ii) groups of “contenders,” who are often negatively

126. See Brief in Support of McKnight, supra note 60, at 25.
127. I want to acknowledge the inspiration of Lynn Paltrow and her organization,
National Advocates for Pregnant Women (NAPW), for building a national response network
and working on all fronts to defend pregnant women charged with criminal acts.
128. Paltrow, The War on Drugs and the War on Abortion, supra note 17, at 201-02.
129. For a discussion of the policies South Carolina employed, see ELLEN ALDERMAN &
CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 123 (1995).
130. ANNE LARASON SCHNEIDER & HELEN INGRAM, POLICY DESIGN FOR DEMOCRACY 102
(1997).
131. Id.
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constructed as undeserving, greedy, or willing to deal behind closed doors
because they have some power; (iii) dependents, constructed as deserving if
needy and helpless; and (iv) deviants, who are negatively constructed as
undeserving. 132 According to Schneider and Ingram’s calculus, policymakers gain similar benefits by punishing deviant groups as they do by
rewarding advantaged groups. 133 Due to the political appeal of symbolic
vengeance in such arenas, 134 policies of incarceration, coercion, or unduly
intensive surveillance may be oversubscribed or used inappropriately.135
While pluralists assume that there will be self-corrective mechanisms, they
are unlikely to prevail in such “degenerative” issue contexts.
Reproductive rights movements run into predictable trouble according to
Schneider’s and Ingram’s typology. 136 Their “target populations” cross all
groups—social policies must simultaneously represent highly advantaged
groups, as well as less advantaged groups of contenders, dependents, and
deviants. As such, they run into internal contradictions as well as external
contention over the allocation of rights, resources, obligations, and burdens.
The perennial accusation that the “white” reproductive rights movement is
insufficiently attentive to low-income women and women of color has been
belied by the second and third generation reproductive rights organizations
that focus specifically on them. Advocates of drug-using women have built
a social movement that does not support the distinction between “good”
and “bad” actors. Instead, they have sought unconditional rights and a
facilitative relationship between women and the state, as well as seeking to
move the drugs-and-pregnancy debate outside the “degenerative” issue
context of the adversarial model and the anti-abortion movement.
Women were largely invisible within the nation’s drug policy until the
late 1980s crack-cocaine epidemic brought the “decline of maternal
instinct” to the national stage. 137 Prior to that, it was hard for women’s
health advocates to draw attention to the issue. During the crack-cocaine
132. Id.
133. Id. at 120-22.
134. See id. at 120 (“[G]overnments are especially likely to shift toward a politics of
punishment as a means of displacing blame onto others and creating opportunities for
political gain.”).
135. See id. (“Some powerless groups offer easy scapegoats for societal problems . . . .
Providing punishments to persons constructed as deviants yields little or no resistance as
these groups have essentially no political power, and the actions are generally applauded by
the broader public because they believe deviants deserve to be punished.”).
136. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text for a description of Schneider’s and
Ingram’s typology.
137. CAMPBELL, USING WOMEN, supra note 11, at 170; see Campbell, Regulating
“Maternal Instinct”, supra note 9, at 895 (“Policymakers announced the erosion of
‘maternal instincts’ in the thick of the crack cocaine crisis of the late 1980’s.”).
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scare, and well into the 1990s as the scare abated, many states debated
policies to target using women. 138 While “no-pregnancy” conditions had
been struck down as “impermissively overbroad,” 139 there have been drugrelated cases in which lower courts have required women to choose
sterilization or jail.140 For the most part, however, legislatures and courts
have determined that there are much better ways to protect the public and
prevent injury to future children than criminal prosecution of pregnant
women. On purely instrumental grounds, specific criminalization fails to
achieve our goals of healthy births, drug-free pregnancies, adequate
prenatal and postpartum care, or adequate support for already-born
children. So what were these prosecutions about? If we allow prosecutions
to become symbolic policy, the unfortunate individual outcome of a cycle
in which we as a society seek retribution against women who transgress,
we ignore that these are among the most vulnerable of women. We ignore
that women are far from the majority of drug users and abusers, and that
pregnant women are a very small subset of addicted persons.
What messages will pregnant women get regarding their constitutional
protections? Will pregnant women be forced to forego the protections of
informed consent, irregardless of their circumstances? Should we allow
women’s rights to self-sovereignty, freedom from government intrusion,
and right to bodily integrity to be questioned? If so, when, on what
grounds, and at what cost? Daniels argues that even a single case where a
pregnant woman is forced to undergo medical treatment that anyone else
would not be forced to undergo chips away at all women’s rights to selfsovereignty: “[w]omen face a risk of social coercion never faced by men
simply because of women’s ability to carry a fetus to term.” 141 This gender
differential derives from socially assigned roles in social reproduction, and
the preoccupation with some women’s failure to meet theirs. If drug policy
can be read as a form of cultural production, then we may ask what our
treatment of drug-using women tells us about what women are supposed to
be and do in our political culture.

138. ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 129, at 121-23 (explaining Florida’s attempt to
prosecute a woman for ingesting crack during labor, Connecticut’s attempt to deprive a
woman who used cocaine after her water broke of parental rights, and South Carolina’s
testing of pregnant women for illegal drug use).
139. Id. at 125 (citing People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Ct. App. 1992)).
140. See, e.g., Sheila C. Cummings, Is Crack the Cure?, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 1, 5 (2003)
(discussing the monetary incentives that “Project Prevention,” a private organization, offers
to encourage addicted men and women to undergo sterilization); Jim Persels, The Norplant
Condition: Protecting the Unborn or Violating Fundamental Rights?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 237
(1992) (discussing the constitutionality of forced sterilization by states).
141. DANIELS, supra note 1, at 53.
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